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Abstract: We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer
serve a market with a fuel-e¢ cient automobile under a scrappage program by the government.
The program awards a subsidy to each consumer who trades in his or her used automobile
with a new fuel-e¢ cient automobile, if the manufacturers suggested retail price (MSRP)
for the new one does not exceed a cuto¤ level. We derive the conditions assuring that the
manufacturer has an incentive to qualify for the program, and nd that when the cuto¤ level
is low, the manufacturer may be unwilling to qualify for the program even if the subsidy
is high. We also show that when the manufacturer qualies for the program, increasing
the MSRP cuto¤ level would raise the manufacturers expected prot but may decrease the
expected sales. A moderate cuto¤ level can maximize the e¤ectiveness of the program in
stimulating the sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles, whereas a su¢ ciently high cuto¤ level can
result in the largest prot for the manufacturer. The retailers prot always increases when the
manufacturer chooses to qualify for the program. Furthermore, we compute the governments
optimal MSRP cuto¤ level and subsidy for a given sales target, and nd that as the program
budget increases, the government should raise the subsidy but reduce the MSRP cuto¤ level
to maximize sales.
Key words: Supply chain management; government scrappage program; manufacturer; re-
tailer; single period.
1 Introduction
In recent years many scrappage programs have been implemented to encourage the trade-in
of old automobiles with more fuel-e¢ cient new automobiles. Such programs generally have
1The authors are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for a number of insightful comments that helped
improve this paper.
2Corresponding author: (lipingliang@ln.edu.hk; Tel: +852 2616-8103; Fax: +852 2892-2442).
1
the dual aim of stimulating the automobile market and removing ine¢ cient, high-emission
automobiles from the road for the purpose of environmental protection. Even though some
governments introduced similar programs (e.g., tax rebate programs) in the 1990s, the scrap-
page program was widely adopted in a number of countries only during the global recession
that began in 2008. This happened because the 2008 nancial storm heavily inuenced the
world-wide automobile sector, resulting in an unprecedented automobile industry crisis.
In Table 1, we provide a summary of automobile scrappage programs that have been
implemented by the governments of eight countries or regions in Asia, Europe, and North
America. Under a scrappage program for automobile, a contingent subsidy is provided to
each consumer who trades in his or her old vehicle for a new, more fuel-e¢ cient one that has
a combined fuel economy.
Country
/Region
Scrappage Program for Automobile Trade-In
China The government provided each consumer with a subsidy of RMB3,000 RMB6,000 for trading in
(Chinaautoweb.Com, 2010) a used, heavy polluting car or truck with a new one since June 2009, and later increased
the subsidy to RMB5,000 RMB18,000 in order to implement the program more e¤ectively.
France Each consumer can claim a e1,000 subsidy from the government if he or she trades in a used
(IHS Global Insight, 2010) car that is more than 10 years old with a new car that meets Euro IV emission standards.
Germany The government o¤ers a e2,500 subsidy (with a total subsidy value of e1.5 billion) to consumers
(IHS Global Insight, 2010) who trade in their old vehicles for new ones that have low carbon dioxide emissions.
Greece The government o¤ers the subsidy of e1,900 e4,200 to each buyer who trades in his or her
(IHS Global Insight, 2010) old car with a new one that has ecological credentials.
Japan The government provides a subsidy of JPY250,000 for the trade-in of each vehicle rst
(Yacobucci and Canis, 2009) registered 13 years ago or earlier with a new model compliant with 2010 fuel e¢ ciency standards.
Mexico The federal government provides a 15,000 pesos subsidy to each consumer who replaces his
(Niedermeyer, 2009) or her vehicle that is at least 10 years old with a new, fuel-e¢ cient one, if the manufacturers
suggested retail price (MSRP) for the new vehicle is less than or equal to 160,000 pesos.
Slovaks The government provides a e1,000 state subsidy to each buyer who replaces a car that is more
(IHS Global Insight, 2010) than 10 years old with a new one, if the MSRP for the new car is not greater than e25,000.
The United States The U.S. president recently signed the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) act.
(Yacobucci and Canis, 2009) Under this act, if the MSRP for a new automobile is not greater than US$45,000, then the
government rewards each consumer with a subsidy of US$3,500 or US$4,500, which depends on
the types of both the new and the old automobiles.
Table 1: A summary of scrappage programs that have been implemented by the governments
of eight countries or regions in Asia, Europe, and North America.
Some governments (e.g., Hong Kong, the United States, etc.) have reported that the
scrappage program is useful for stimulating the sales of fuel-e¢ cient vehicles. For example,
the Environmental Protection Department of Hong Kong prepared HK$3.2 billion for its
scrappage program, and announced that this amount had been committed within 18 months.
As reported by Yacobucci and Canis (2009), the United States appropriated an initial amount
of $1 billion for its Car Allowance Rebate System(CARS) program to support qualifying
transactions. Immediately after the rst week of implementing the CARS program, the
United Statess Department of Transportation announced that this program was embraced
by thousands of consumers and by automobile retailers across the country, and nearly all of
the funds appropriated for the CARS program were committed. In a response to the high
demand resulting from the CARS program, the House of Representatives decided to make
available an additional $2 billion to extend the program. In Slovaks, 62.3% of the total sales
realized between March and December 2009 were attributed to the governments scrappage
program; see the IHS Global Insight (2010).
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From our above discussion, we nd that the scrappage program can be e¤ective in stim-
ulating sales for fuel-e¢ cient automobiles during the economic recession. Hence, it would be
important, and interesting, to consider the following relevant questions. First, we need to
investigate if the manufacturers and the retailers prots when the manufacturer qualies for
the scrappage program are higher than those when the manufacturer does not qualify. We
note that the governments target of implementing the scrappage program is to boost the
sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles for the purpose of reducing harmful emissions and protect-
ing the environment. Accordingly, we examine the conditions under which the program can
e¤ectively stimulate the sales. We nd from Table 1 that some governments (e.g., Mexico,
Slovaks, and the United States) provide their subsidies only to the buyers who purchase new
cars each with a manufacturers suggested retail price (MSRP) no more than a pre-determined
cuto¤ level, whereas other governments (e.g., China, France, Germany, and Japan) do not
set any MSRP cuto¤ level for their scrappage programs. It thus behooves us to investigate
the impact of the MSRP cuto¤ level and the subsidy amount on the automobile sales. To
address our above questions in a general setting, we assume in this paper that the scrappage
program for automobile trade-in involves a cuto¤ level and a subsidy.
We consider a two-echelon supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve con-
sumers with a fuel-e¢ cient automobile under a governments scrappage program. The man-
ufacturer makes a wholesale pricing decision and, as in the real-world automobile industry
(see, e.g., Leaseguide.com 2011), determines an MSRP as a markup above the wholesale
price. In accordance with the practice, the MSRP can be calculated as the manufacturers
wholesale price plus a markup percentage of the wholesale price. The markup percentage for
an automobile uniquely corresponds to a gross prot margin, which, in the past two decades,
was usually between 4% and 13% with an average value in the range [6%; 8%], as indicated
at Leaseguide.com (2011).
The retailer purchases the manufacturers automobiles at the wholesale price, and then
serves heterogenous consumers in a market of a nite size. That is, there are a certain, nite
number of consumers each having a net valuation which is the consumers valuation of a
new, fuel-e¢ cient automobile minus the valuation of his or her old automobile. To reect the
heterogeneity, we characterize the consumersnet valuations by a non-negative, nite-valued
random variable. As in practice, the retail price for each consumer is determined as a discount
of the MSRP, which results from the negotiation between the consumer and the retailer.
Accordingly, we analyze the bargaining process to determine the discount of the MSRP and
calculate the retail price for each consumer. Since the retailer and the consumer may have
di¤erent bargaining powers, we apply the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) scheme which
was developed by Roth (1979) to analyze the two-player cooperative game and nd a unique
MSRP discount, which determines the retail price charged to the consumer. For a recent
application of GNB in supply chain analysis, see Huang et al. (2013), who performed a
numerical study to analyze automobile supply chains under a subsidy scheme, and Luo et al.
(2014), who analytically investigated a price-discount scheme for an automobile supply chain.
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We then use the negotiated retail prices to develop the manufacturers prot function,
and maximize it to nd the manufacturers unique optimal wholesale price under a scrappage
program. We derive the condition under which the manufacturer can benet from the pro-
gram and is thus willing to set an MSRP lower than or equal to the cuto¤ level and qualify
for the program. In addition, we show that, when the manufacturer qualies for the scrap-
page program, raising the MSRP cuto¤ level will result in an increase in the manufacturers
expected prot but a decrease in the expected sales. Therefore, if the government intends
to increase the expected sales for the fuel-e¢ cient automobile, then it should set a moderate
value for the MSRP cuto¤ level. In addition, we nd that a small subsidy may be ine¤ective
in stimulating the sales. The governments optimal subsidy is increasing in its budget, while
its optimal MSRP cuto¤ level is decreasing in the budget.
2 Literature Review
This paper is related to two streams of literature. The rst stream explores the trade-in
subsidies provided by rms. For example, Levinthal and Purohit (1989) investigated a rms
trade-in scheme for its durable products, and showed that the rm can utilize trade-in rebates
to promote an improved product generation by deterring the secondary market. For the
trade-in problem by Levinthal and Purohit (1989), van Ackere and Reynolds (1995) found
that trade-in rebates can encourage consumers to trade in their used products for new ones.
Fudenburg and Tirole (1998) considered the optimal pricing and trade-in rebate decisions for
a rm selling its products in a market that involves potential trade-in consumers who intend
to trade in used products for new ones and potential rst-time buyers who may directly
purchase the new products from the rm. Ray et al. (2005) also studied the optimal pricing
and trade-in strategies for a rm that satises an age-dependent demand with durable and
remanufactured products. Bruce et al. (2006) investigated a trade-in problem, and derived
the conditions under which the manufacturer of a durable product is willing to o¤er a cash
rebate to each consumer who trades in the used product for a new one. Using prospect theory,
Kim et al. (2011) developed an analytical model to explore consumerschoices in their trade-
ins. Moreover, some researchers addressed the trade-in issues for general durable goods; see
Clerides and Hadjiyiannis (2008), Prince (2009), and Rao et al. (2009).
Our paper di¤ers from this stream of research in that we contribute to the literature
by nding (i) the consumerspurchase decisions and the expected sales, (ii) the negotiated
retail price, (iii) the optimal wholesale price, and (iv) the governments optimal MSRP cuto¤
level and subsidy that maximize the expected sales. We can nd the di¤erences from both
managerial and technical perspectives. From the managerial perspective, the trade-in policy
implemented by a government primarily aims at stimulating the sales of new fuel-e¢ cient
automobiles to reduce CO2 emissions, whereas the trade-in policy implemented by a rm
mainly aims at increasing the rms prot. A policy that e¤ectively increases a rms prot
may not be e¤ective in increasing the sales. From the technical perspective, the rm with its
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trade-in policy needs to make optimal decisions on price, subsidy, and other policy-related
variables. However, when the trade-in subsidy is provided by a government, the rm only
makes its optimal pricing decision in response to the governments scrappage program, for
which the government decides on its optimal cuto¤ level and subsidy that maximize the
expected sales.
The second stream of literature is concerned with the scrappage programs (colloquially
known as cash for clunkers) implemented by governments, under which a subsidy is o¤ered
to each consumer who trades in a used automobile for a new one. A number of researchers
investigated the environmental and economic consequences of such scrappage programs. For
a comprehensive review on the environmental impact of the scrappage programs, see Wee et
al. (2011). Some researchers examined the environmental impact of the scrappage programs
from the empirical perspective. For instance, by measuring the e¢ ciency of the program in
terms of the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, Morrison et al. (2010) and Zolnik (2012)
examined the costs generated by the program. Ryan (2012) estimated the e¢ ciency of the
scrappage program in pollution reduction. As an alternative to the subsidy, governments may
apply tax policies to inuence consumerstrading-in behaviors. Fosgerau and Jensen (2013)
considered the e¤ects of the governments tax reform on CO2 emissions and social welfare.
Brand et al. (2013) and Fullerton and West (2010) considered the combinations of tax and
subsidy for the control of car pollution.
Besides the above empirical studies, researchers examined the environmental e¤ects of the
scrappage program using various analytical models, which include the discrete analysis (e.g.,
Adda and Cooper, 2000), mass point duration model (e.g., Chen and Niemeier, 2005), integer
program model (e.g., Gao and Stasko, 2009), cost-benet analysis (e.g., Lavee and Becker,
2009), life cycle optimization model (e.g., Kim et al. 2003, Kim et al. 2004, Spitzley et al.
2005, Lenski et al. 2010, and Basbagill et al. 2013), and others (e.g., Chen et al. 2010 and
Lorentziadis and Vournas 2011).
Researchers also analytically investigated the economic impact of the scrappage program.
For example, Hahn (1995) assessed the likely benets and costs of the scrappage program, and
Alberini et al. (1995) modeled the owners car tenure and scrappage decision, and forecasted
the participation rates in the scrappage program. Incorporating the scrappage cycle length,
de Palma and Kilani (2008) presented an economic model to assess the impact of scrap value
for old cars and taxes on gasoline. By maximizing the social net benet, Iwata and Arimura
(2009) analyzed the optimal retirement timing of the Japanese program for air pollution
regulation. Licanaro and Sampayo (2006) designed a model to quantitatively evaluate Spains
1997 scrappage program.
In addition, researchers examined the economic e¤ects using the empirical data in some
specic programs. Several studies recently investigated the impact of the U.S. 2009 automobile
CARS program (see, Yacobucci and Canis 2009, Busse et al. 2012, Mian and Su 2012,
Copeland and Kahn 2013, Klier and Rubenstein 2013, Li et al. 2013, and Li and Wei 2013).
A recent report by IHS Global Insight (2010) assessed the economic, environmental, and safety
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impact of the scrappage program implemented by countries in European Union. Aldred and
Tepe (2011) considered the scrappage programs in Germany and the UK. Huse and Lucinda
(2013) investigated the e¤ects of the Swedish green car rebateprogram on CO2 emission
and the program cost.
Most publications were concerned with empirical study for the scrappage program. Though
some researchers developed analytical models for such a program, our analytical work still
signicantly di¤ers from them in several aspects.
1. The governments scrappage program under our study involves an MSRP cuto¤ level
(in addition to a subsidy). To the best of our knowledge, no existent publication has
analytically considered such a cuto¤ level for any scrappage scheme, which is actually
important to the programs e¤ectiveness in stimulating the sales because of the following
fact. The cuto¤ level could lead consumers to buy qualifying automobiles i.e., those
with MSRPs lower than or equal to the cuto¤ level and obtain the subsidy from the
government. Manufacturers may respond to consumerspurchase behaviors by reducing
their wholesale prices andMSRPs to qualify for the scrappage program. Thus, the choice
of the cuto¤ level a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of the scrappage program. It behooves us to
consider the scrappage program including the MSRP cuto¤ level and the subsidy. This
saliently distinguishes our paper from extant publications.
2. The modeling approach in our paper di¤ers from that in any existent publication. None
of the publications regarding the governments scrappage program analyzed consumers
trade-in decisions, which is, however, important because the program aims at encourag-
ing consumers to buy qualifying automobiles. In this paper, we consider each consumers
purchase decision by using the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) scheme to compute
the retail price that is negotiated by the retailer and the consumer. This di¤ers from
most extant publications which (i) ignored consumersbehaviors in their automobile
transactions, (ii) allowed the retailer to unilaterally decide on an optimal retail price
maximizing the retailers individual prot, and (iii) presumed that consumers in all
successful transactions accept the retail price. Moreover, we allow heterogeneity in
consumersvaluations, which is important because it enables us to investigate how the
scrappage program entices low-valuation consumers to trade in their used automobiles.
Thus, compared with relevant publications, the modeling approach in our paper is more
realistic. Using our analytical results characterizing consumerspurchase behaviors, we
derive a demand function, which is expected to analytically describe automobile sales
in an accurate manner.
3. Our realistic model and analysis for the scrappage program that has appeared in real
life generate a number of new managerial insights that have not been found in extant
publications. For a summary of our new insights, see Section 7.
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3 Preliminaries
We consider a two-level automobile supply chain in the presence of a scrappage program,
where a manufacturer produces a fuel-e¢ cient automobile that meets relevant requirements
in the scrappage program at the unit acquisition cost c. The manufacturer sells its products
to a retailer in a market at the wholesale price w.
In practice, an automobile manufacturer usually recommends to its retailers a suggested
retail price ps which is commonly calculated as the manufacturers wholesale price plus a
markup percentage (  0) of the wholesale price i.e., ps = (1 + )w as indicated by a
large number of facts in the automobile industry, see, e.g., Martí (2000), Biz.Yahoo.Com
(2011), and Leaseguide.com (2011). Note that some rms may use the concept of gross
margininstead of the markup percentage to calculate the MSRP. In fact, the gross margin
and the markup percentage uniquely correspond to each other, such that the gross margin
is equal to =(1 + ) and the value of  can be found as (prot margin)/(1 prot margin).
Therefore, using the markup percentage to determine the MSRP does not result in any loss
of generality of our model and analysis.
The above discussion indicates that, in the automobile industry, the MSRP actually re-
ects a markup ceiling that a manufacturer allows its retailer to take; for details, see, e.g., a
case report by Martí (2000). Since the MSRP of the automobile is known to consumers, the
actual retail prices are usually not higher than the MSRP, because the retail price charged
to a consumer is commonly determined as the result of negotiation between the retailer and
the consumer over a discount from the MSRP. Therefore, we can calculate the retail price pr
for a consumer as pr = (1  )ps = (1  )(1 + )w, where  2 [0; 1] represents the discount
from MSRP ps. Because the retail price is greater than or equal to the wholesale price w, i.e.,
pr  w, we should determine the value of  such that (1  )(1 + )  1, or,   =(1 + ).
In our paper, the market that the retailer serves has a nite consumer base B consisting
of all potential consumers who may trade in their old automobiles for new ones. Moreover,
each consumer in the market only buys one unit of automobile in a transaction. Consumers
on the base B may have di¤erent valuations over their used automobiles; they may also draw
di¤erent valuations from the new automobile. To reect the fact, we assume the heterogeneity
of consumersnet trade-in valuations. We dene a consumers net trade-in valuation as the
consumers valuation of the new automobile minus his or her valuation of the used automobile.
The heterogeneous net valuations of consumers are characterized by a non-negative random
parameter  with p.d.f. f() and c.d.f. F () on support [0; ], where  is the maximum net
valuation of all consumers in the market.
Let A and s denote the cuto¤ level and subsidy for the scrappage program, respectively.
We nd that each consumer can gain at most  + s from trade-in when ps  A, or, w 
A=(1 + ), but can obtain at most  when w > A=(1 + ). Thus, to assure the e¤ectiveness of
the MSRP ps, the manufacturer should determine its wholesale price such that w  ps  +
1fwA=(1+)gs, where 1fwA=(1+)g  1, if w  A=(1+); 1fwA=(1+)g  0, if w > A=(1+).
Under this condition, we nd that if A < w, then the manufacturer certainly cannot qualify
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for the program; but, if A  +1fwA=(1+)gs, then the manufacturer can always qualify for
the program. Taking the above into account, the government should determine its cuto¤ level
A such that w  A   + 1fwA=(1+)g  s. In addition, we assume that the manufacturers
wholesale price is greater than the subsidy s, i.e., w > s. This assumption is consistent
with practice. For example, under the U.S. CARS program, the automobile type-dependent
subsidy for each qualied transaction is $3; 500 or $4; 500, which is signicantly lower than
most manufacturerswholesale prices.
Next, we develop a net surplus function for a consumer who possesses a specic net trade-
in valuation . Note that the consumers net surplus is computed as his or her net trade-in
valuation  minus the purchase cost [i.e., the retail price pr = (1   )(1 + )w] possibly
plus the subsidy s. Since whether or not the consumer can get the subsidy s depends on the
comparison between the cuto¤ level A and the MSRP ps (which is dependent on the wholesale
price w), we can write the consumers net surplus function u(;w) as,
u(;w) =    (1  )(1 + )w + 1fwA=(1+)g  s. (1)
According to the above discussion, we nd that, given the governments scrappage pro-
gram (A; s), the manufacturer rst determines its wholesale price w and releases it to the
retailer, who then bargains with each consumer over a retail price. The MSRP ps is visible
to all consumers in their price negotiations. Such a decision process is depicted by Figure 1,
where the arrow between the manufacturer and retailer denotes that the wholesale price w is
unilaterally determined by the manufacturer, and the double-head arrow between the retailer
and a consumer represents that the retail price p is determined as a result of the bargaining
between the retailer and the consumer.
Figure 1: The decision process in the two-level automobile supply chain.
To help readers easily follow our modeling and analysis, we summarize the notations used
in this paper in Table 2.
4 Negotiated Retail Price
We investigate the price negotiation between the retailer and a consumer with a specic net
valuation , who bargain over the discount  of the MSRP ps, given the scrappage program
(A; s) and the manufacturers wholesale price w. The bargaining issue is important to our
paper mainly because of the following fact. If we do not consider the bargaining issue to nd
the negotiated retail price but determine the optimal retail price by maximizing the retailers
expected prot, then there will be a unique retail price for all consumers, which prevents the
consumers with low valuations from buying. This results in underestimation of the expected
sales and the total carbon emission reduction, because as a result of price negotiation, those
8
A : MSRP cuto¤ level in the scrappage program;  : negotiated discount from the MSRP ps;
B : nite consumer base;  : consumers bargaining power relative to
Cs : governments total subsidy cost; the retailer, which is a random variable
Cs : governments budget for the program; with p.d.f. g() and c.d.f. G();
c : manufacturers unit acquisition cost;  : consumers net trade-in valuation,
pr : unit retail price; which is a random variable with
s : subsidy in the scrappage program; p.d.f. f() and c.d.f. F ();
u : consumers net surplus;  : maximum net valuation of all consumers;
w : unit wholesale price;  : markup percentage of the MSRP.
Table 2: List of notations that are used in this paper.
low-valuation consumers may purchase automobiles at lower retail prices. That is, ignoring
the bargaining issue can undervalue the impact of the governments scrappage program on
the sales and the automobile supply chain.
Since, in practice, the retailer and each consumer may have di¤erent bargaining powers, we
use the generalized Nash bargaining (GNB) scheme developed by Roth (1979) to nd the
negotiated discount and retail price for the two players. In our bargaining problem, without
loss of generality, we assume that the consumer is player 1 with the bargaining power  and
the retailer is player 2 with the bargaining power 1   . Consumers may possess di¤erent
bargaining powers when negotiating with the retailer. To incorporate the heterogeneity of
consumers in their bargaining powers, we assume that  is a random variable with the p.d.f.
g() and the c.d.f. G() on the support [0; 1].
We next compute these two playersprots (y1; y2) and security levels (y01; y
0
2). The con-
sumers net surplus u(;w) in (1) can be regarded as his or her prot;that is, y1 = u(;w).
The retailers prot from the transaction is calculated as its sales revenue (i.e., the re-
tail price pr) minus wholesale price w that the retailer pays to the manufacturer, that is,
y2 = pr   w = [  (1 + )]w. Moreover, for our problem, the retailers and the consumers
security levels (also known as status quo points) are dened as these two playersguaran-
teed prots when they do not complete any transaction. Since neither the retailer nor the
consumer will gain any prot if no transaction occurs between them, the status quo points
are (y01; y
0
2) = (0; 0) and the set of Pareto optimal solutions is P = f(y1; y2)ju(;w)  0 and
[  (1 + )]w  0g. Using the above, we write the GNB model for our bargaining problem
as,
max   [   (1  )(1 + )w + 1fwA=(1+)g  s][w   (1 + )w]1 
s.t.    (1  )(1 + )w + 1fwA=(1+)g  s  0 and w   (1 + )w  0.
(2)
The negotiated retail price obtained from the above Nash bargaining model cannot exceed
the MSRP ps. We derive the negotiated discount and retail price as follows.
Theorem 1 If  < 1  w 1fwA=(1+)gs, then the consumer does not buy any automobile
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from the retailer. Otherwise, if 1    , then the consumer and the retailer complete the
transaction with the following GNB-characterized discount:
 =
8<:
(1 +   )w   (1  )( + 1fwA=(1+)g  s)
(1 + )w
, if 1    2,
0, if 2    ,
(3)
where 2  (1+ )w=(1 ) 1fwA=(1+)gs, and the retail price charged to the consumer
is thus computed as
pr(wj) =
(
w + (1  )( + 1fwA=(1+)g  s), if 1    2,
(1 + )w, if 2    .
Proof. For a proof of this theorem and the proofs for all subsequent theorems, see Appendix
A.
We learn from the above theorem that only consumers with su¢ ciently large net valuations
are willing to trade in their used automobiles for new ones under the scrappage program.
According to Theorem 1, given the wholesale price w, we can calculate the expected retail
price for each transaction as follows:




















1  F (1) , (4)
which must be greater than the wholesale price w because w < +1fwA=(1+)g s. We then
develop the manufacturers and the retailers expected prot functions as(




[(1  ) R 2
1





Moreover, we can compute the expected sales (i.e., the total number of automobiles that
consumers on the base B buy) as D(w) = B[1  F (1)].
Remark 1 Theorem 1 also indicates consumerspurchase decisions when the government
does not implement a scrappage program, which corresponds to the case that s = 0. In the
case of no scrappage program, a consumer with  < 1js=0 = w does not buy from the retailer;
but if 1js=0    , then the consumer is willing to buy at the following retail price:
pr(wj)js=0 =
(
w + (1  ), if 1js=0    2js=0 = w[1 + =(1  )],
(1 + )w, if 2js=0    .
(6)
Noting that 1js=0 > 1js>0 when w  A=(1 + ), we nd that the scrappage program can
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entice more consumers to buy from the retailer. 
5 Manufacturers Optimal Wholesale Price
We maximize the manufacturers expected prot M(w) in (5) to nd its optimal wholesale
pricing decision under a given scrappage program (A; s). As Theorem 1 indicates, the value
of 1 in (5) depends on the condition that w  A=(1 + ). Therefore, in order to nd the
optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer, we need to consider the following two scenarios:
w  A=(1+) and w > A=(1+), and maximize M(w) for each scenario. Then, we compare
the maximum prots obtained for the above two scenarios to nd the manufacturers globally
optimal wholesale price.
5.1 Prot Maximization under the Constraint that w  A=(1 + )
When w  A=(1 + ), the manufacturers optimization problem can be described as,
max
w
M1(w)  B(w   c)[1  F (w   s)], s.t. w  A=(1 + ). (7)
Lemma 1 If f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave on [0; ], then the manufac-
turers expected prot M1(w) is a unimodal function of the wholesale price w.
Proof. For our proof, see Appendix B.
The above lemma indicates that the unimodality of function M1(w) depends on the con-
dition that f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave. Such a condition is acceptable,
because, as Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) showed, many commonly-used distributions e.g.,
uniform, normal, exponential, logistic, Laplace (double exponential), Weibull, Gamma, etc.
satisfy the condition. To that end, we assume that the p.d.f. f() possesses the properties of
continuous di¤erentiability and log-concavity.
Theorem 2 Given the scrappage program (A; s), the manufacturers optimal wholesale price
w1 when w  A=(1 + ) can be uniquely determined as
w1 =
(
w^1, if w^1  A=(1 + ),
A=(1 + ), if w^1 > A=(1 + ),
(8)
where w^1 is a unique solution to the following equation:
w^1 = [1  F (w^1   s)]=f(w^1   s) + c.  (9)
Then, we can compute the expected sales as D(w1) = B[1 F (w1  s)], and calculate the
total subsidy cost as Cs(s) = sD(w1) = Bs[1   F (w1   s)]. Using w1 in (8), we rewrite the
manufacturers expected prot as M1(w1) = B(w

1   c)[1  F (w1   s)].
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Corollary 1 The value of w^1 is increasing in the subsidy s, i.e., @w^1=@s > 0; but the incre-
ment in w^1 is smaller than that in the subsidy, i.e., @w^1=@s < 1.
Proof. For a proof of this corollary and that for the next corollary, see Appendix C.
The above corollary shows that, if w^1  A=(1 +), then increasing the subsidy s leads the
manufacturer to raise its wholesale price with an increment lower than the rise in s. Thus,
the MSRP ps = (1 + )w is also increasing in the subsidy s.
Theorem 3 If w^1  A=(1 + ), then the expected sales, and the manufacturers and the
retailers expected prots are strictly increasing in the subsidy s. In addition, the total
subsidy cost is increasing in s. 
The above theorem implies that both the manufacturer and the retailer can benet from
an increase in the subsidy s, when the government chooses a su¢ ciently high cuto¤ level
such that A  (1 + )w^1. Though, the government may not need to choose a very large
subsidy because, otherwise, it will incur a high expenseCs(s), which is considered as an
input for implementing the scrappage program. Recall from Section 1 that some govern-
ments (e.g., China, France, Germany, Greece, and Japan) do not involve any cuto¤ level into
their scrappage programs, so that each consumer can obtain a subsidy no matter what retail
price the manufacturer suggests. That is, for those governmentsscrappage programs, the
cuto¤ level in our model is set as the maximum value + s. Even though other governments
(e.g., Mexico, Slovaks, and the United States) explicitly apply cuto¤ levels to their programs,
we nd that those cuto¤ levels are signicantly higher than the suggested prices of qualifying
automobiles. For example, the U.S. governments cuto¤ level for its scrappage program is
$45; 000, as indicated by Table 1. According to the report by IHS (2010), which is a leading
global source of critical information and insight, the average MSRP for new vehicles under
the U.S. scrappage program was $22; 450, which is signicantly lower than the cuto¤ level
$45; 000.
5.2 Prot Maximization under the Constraint that w > A=(1 + )
When w > A=(1 + ), all consumers who buy the manufacturers automobiles cannot obtain
the subsidy s, and, 1 = w. Therefore, under the constraint that w > A=(1 + ), the
manufacturer maximizes the following expected prot:
M2(w)  B(w   c)[1  F (w)]. (10)
Theorem 4 Given the scrappage program (A; s), we maximize the manufacturers expected
prot M2(w) in (10) subject to w > A=(1 + ), and nd that the manufacturers optimal
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wholesale price w2 can be uniquely determined as follows:
w2 =
8><>:
w^2, if A=(1 + ) < w^2  =(1 + ),
=(1 + ), if A=(1 + ) < =(1 + ) < w^2,
A=(1 + ) + ", if w^2  A=(1 + ),
(11)
where " is a positive innitesimal, and w^2 is a unique solution to the equation that w^2 =
[1  F (w^2)]=f(w^2) + c. 





2   c)[1   F (w2)], and compute the maximum expected sales as D(w2) =
B[1  F (w2)].
Corollary 2 If s > 0, then w^1 > w^2. 
The above corollary means that, if no cuto¤ level is involved into a scrappage program
implemented by, e.g., China, France, Germany, etc., then the resulting wholesale price is
greater than that in the absence of the program. That is, the scrappage program may result
in an increase in the wholesale price.
5.3 The Optimal Wholesale Price
Using our analytic results in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we now derive the manufacturers globally
optimal wholesale price maximizing its expected prot under no constraint, in the presence of
the governments scrappage program (A; s). To do so, we need to compare the manufacturers
maximum prot when w  A=(1 + ) (the manufacturer qualies for the scrappage program)
and that when w > A=(1 + ) (the manufacturer does not qualify for the program).
Theorem 5 Given the governments program (A; s) for automobile scrappage, the manufac-
turers globally optimal wholesale price w can be uniquely determined as follows:
w =
8>>>><>>>>:
w^1 if A=(1 + )  w^1,
A=(1 + ) if w^2  A=(1 + ) < w^1,
~w1 if A=(1 + ) < w^2  =(1 + ),
~w2 if A=(1 + ) < =(1 + ) < w^2,
where ~w1 and ~w2 are given as
~w1 
(
A=(1 + ), if M1(A=(1 + ))  M2(w^2),
w^2, if M1(A=(1 + )) < M2(w^2);
~w2 
(
A=(1 + ), if M1(A=(1 + ))  M2(=(1 + )),
=(1 + ), if M1(A=(1 + )) < M2(=(1 + )). 
The above theorem suggests that the scrappage program signicantly a¤ects the man-
ufacturers optimal wholesale pricing decision. Specically, if the manufacturers optimal
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wholesale price w is w^1 or A=(1 + ), then the manufacturer can qualify for the program
and achieve the expected sales D(w). As a result, the government needs to spend the total
subsidy Cs(s) = sD(w). Otherwise, if the manufacturer does not qualify for the program,
then each consumer buying the manufacturers product cannot obtain any subsidy from the
government, which thus incurs no subsidy cost. We next provide a numerical example to
illustrate our above analysis.
Example 1 We assume that each consumers net valuation  is normally distributed on the
support [0; ] with mean E() = $30; 000 and standard deviation  = $4; 000. The average
value of consumers net valuations roughly approximates $30; 000 because, as Markiewicz
(2012) reported, the average transaction price for new fuel cars in April 2012 is $30; 748. We
also note from Jiskha.Com (2010) that, in 2010, the transaction prices of new fuel vehicles
roughly followed a normal distribution with mean $23; 000 and standard deviation $3; 500.
Accordingly, in this numerical example, it should be reasonable to suppose that the consumers
net consumption gains are normally distributed with E() = $30; 000 and  = $4; 000.
The maximum net valuation is set as  = $60; 000. We truncate the normal distribution
function at zero and assume that the probability of negative values is added to that of zero;
we also truncate the distribution at  = , assuming that the probability of  >  is added
to that of . We learn from Leaseguide.com (2011) that an automobile retailers prot
margin is usually between 4% and 13% with an average value falling in range [6%,8%]. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that  = 0:07. According to the discussions from Cuenca et al.
(2000) and Chen et al. (2010), we assume that the manufacturers unit production cost is
c = $25; 000, and the retailer serves a market with the size B = 1; 000; 000. In addition,
as indicated by Chen et al. (2008), it is reasonable to assume that the retailers bargaining
power follows a normal distribution with mean 0:4 and standard deviation 0:1.
Suppose that the scrappage program involves the MSRP cuto¤ level A = $35; 000 and
the subsidy s = $4; 000. The manufacturer determines its optimal wholesale price as w =
w^1 = $32; 297:56. As a result, the MSRP is ps = (1 + )w = $34; 558:39, which is less
than the cuto¤ level A. Thus, the manufacturer qualies for the scrappage program. We can
also nd the manufacturers and the retailers expected prots as M(w) = $4:85 109 and
R(w
) = $1:23  109, respectively, the resulting expected sales are D(w) = 634; 803, and
the governments total subsidy cost is Cs(s) = sD(w) = $2:54 109.
When the cuto¤levelA is reduced from $35; 000 to $32; 000, the manufacturer still qualies
for the scrappage program, choosing its optimal wholesale price as w = A=(1+) = $29; 906:5
and its MSRP as ps = A = $32; 000. The resulting sales are given as, D(w) = 677; 932; the
manufacturers and retailers expected prots are M(w) = $4:16  109 and R(w) =
$1:7 109, respectively; the governments total subsidy cost is Cs(s) = $2:71 109.
When the cuto¤ level A is further reduced from $32; 000 to $28; 000, the manufacturers
optimal wholesale price and MSRP are w = w^2 = $30; 006:63 and ps = $32; 107:06 > A =
$28; 000, which means that the manufacturer does not qualify for the scrappage program.
The resulting expected sales are computed as D(w) = 499; 338; the manufacturers and
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retailers expected prots are determined as M(w) = $2:50109 and R(w) = $1:06109,
respectively. Because no consumer can obtain the subsidy, the governments total subsidy
cost is zero.
From the above three scenarios, we observe that the manufacturers expected prot when
A = $35; 000 is signicantly larger than those when A = $28; 000 and A = $32; 000. This
means that increasing the MSRP cuto¤ level may increase the manufacturers expected prot.
However, the sales when A = $35; 000 are greater than those when A = $28; 000 but less than
those when A = $32; 000. 
6 Sensitivity Analysis and Managerial Implications
In this section, we perform analytical and numerical sensitivity analysis to explore the impact
of the MSRP cuto¤ level A, the subsidy s, and the MSRP markup percentage  on the
manufacturers optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, and the manufacturers and the
retailers maximum expected prots. Moreover, we nd the governments optimal cuto¤ level
and subsidy decisions that maximize the expected sales.
6.1 The Scrappage Programs
We rst investigate the impact of A and s, and then derive the governments optimal decisions.
6.1.1 The Impact of the MSRP Cuto¤ Level A
We learn from Theorem 5 that if A is su¢ ciently low, then the manufacturer may be un-
willing to reduce its wholesale price and MSRP to qualify for the scrappage program. This
occurs possibly because qualifying for the program with a low cuto¤ level may deteriorate
the manufacturers prot margin. As a result, all consumers who buy the manufacturers
automobiles cannot get the subsidy, which means that the scrappage program is ine¤ective in
increasing the sales and reducing air pollution. Therefore, it is important to execute a proper
trade-in scheme for the automobile scrappage. Next, we analytically derive the minimum
MSRP cuto¤ level that induces the manufacturer to qualify for the scrappage program.
Theorem 6 Given a subsidy s, the minimum MSRP cuto¤ level ~A(s) for the manufacturer
to willingly qualify for the scrappage program is obtained as follows:
1. If (1 + )w^2  , then ~A(s) is the unique solution that satises M1(A=(1 + )) =
M2(w^2).
2. If (1 + )w^2 > , then ~A(s) is the unique solution that satises M1(A=(1 + )) =
M2(=(1 + )).
The minimum cuto¤ level ~A(s) is decreasing in the subsidy s. 
If A  ~A(s), the manufacturer determines a wholesale price such that the MSRP is lower
than or equal to the cuto¤ level A and thus qualies for the scrappage program. Otherwise,
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the manufacturer does not qualify for the program. Next, using the parameter values in
Example 1 but increasing A from $24; 000 to $38; 000 in increments of $1; 000, we plot Figure
2 to show the e¤ect of the cuto¤ level A on the manufacturers optimal wholesale price w [in
Figure 2(a)], the expected sales D(w) [in Figure 2(b)], the manufacturers expected prot
M(w
) [in Figure 2(c)], and the retailers expected prot R(w) [in Figure 2(d)]. We nd
that ~A(s) = $29; 584:19. Figure 2 indicates that if A is less than ~A(s) (Zone 1), then the
manufacturer has no intention to qualify for the scrappage program; but if A is greater than
~A(s) (Zone 2), then the manufacturer decides to qualify for the program.
Figure 2: The impact of the cuto¤ level A on the manufacturers optimal wholesale price
w, the expected sales D(w), the manufacturers expected prot M(w), and the retailers
expected prot R(w). Note that, in Zone 1 (where A < A(~s)), the manufacturers optimal
wholesale price w is greater than A=(1 + ), and the manufacturer does not qualify for the
scrappage program, which is thus ine¤ective. In Zone 2 (where A  A(~s)), w  A=(1 + )
and the manufacturer qualies for the program, which is thus e¤ective.
When A is in Zone 1, the manufacturer determines its wholesale price as w^2 = $30; 006:63
and is unwilling to qualify for the scrappage program. This happens because of the following
fact: If the manufacturer reduces its wholesale price, then more consumers are willing to
buy and the expected sales are increased. But, when the cuto¤ level A is small, reducing
the wholesale price to satisfy (1 + )w  A i.e., to qualify for the scrappage program
will greatly decrease the manufacturers prot margin but may not signicantly increase the
expected sales. As a result, when A is in Zone 1, the manufacturer is worse o¤ from reducing
its wholesale price, thereby keeping the wholesale price as w^2, which is independent of the
cuto¤ level A. Therefore, we observe that in Figure 2, when A < ~A(s), the curves of the
optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, the manufacturers and retailers expected prots
are horizontal lines.
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When A is increased from a value in Zone 1 (where A < ~A(s)) to A = ~A(s) (which
belongs to Zone 2), the manufacturer can enjoy a higher prot by reducing its wholesale
price to A=(1 + ) and thus qualifying for the scrappage program. The manufacturers price
reduction across two zones appears to be a downward jump in Figure 2(a). Moreover, such
a price reduction generates a signicant increase in the expected sales [i.e., an upward jump
in Figure 2(b)], which causes an increase in the retailers expected prot [i.e., an upward
jump in Figure 2(d)]. However, there is no jump in the manufacturers expected prot at the
boundary between two zones, as indicated in Figure 2(c). This happens because, as Theorem
6 shows, at the boundary (i.e., A = ~A(s)), the manufacturer is indi¤erent between qualifying
and not qualifying for the program.
We learn from Theorem 5 that when ~A(s)  A < (1 + )w^1 = $34; 558:39, the manufac-
turers optimal wholesale price is w = A=(1+), which is increasing in A, as shown in Figure
2(a). Hence, the expected sales, D(w) = 1 F (A=(1+) s), are decreasing in A; see Figure
2(b). Such a result follows the fact that if the cuto¤ level is higher than the minimum level
(for the manufacturers program qualication) but lower than a su¢ ciently large value (that
does not inuence the manufacturers wholesale pricing decision), then the manufacturer in-
tends to raise its wholesale price to attain a higher expected prot while qualifying for the
scrappage program. Though, an increase in the wholesale price does not signicantly reduce
the expected sales, as indicated by Figure 2(b), because the governments subsidy s awarded
to each consumer helps alleviate the negative impact of the price increase on the sales.
As discussed above, when ~A(s)  A < (1 + )w^1, the manufacturers expected prot,
M1(A=(1 + )) = B[A=(1 + )   c][1   F (A=(1 + )   s)], is increasing in A (indicated
by Figure 2(c)), because M1(w) is a unimodal function with a unique maximizing value
w^1. In addition, we nd from Figure 2(d) that the retailers expected prot R(A=(1 + ))
is decreasing in A, which is attributed to the following fact. An increase in A leads to a
reduction in the expected sales but does not signicantly raise the retail price to increase
the retailers prot margin, because the retail price results from the negotiation between the
retailer and each consumer.
When A  (1+)w^1, we nd from Theorems 3 and 5 that the manufacturer determines its
optimal wholesale price as w^1 = $32; 297:56, and the optimal sales are D(w) = 1 F (w^1 s).
Accordingly, any further increase in A has no impact on the optimal wholesale price, the ex-
pected sales, and the manufacturers and retailers expected prots. The reason is given as
follows: if the manufacturer further increases its wholesale price, then the subsidy for a con-
sumer cannot help reduce the consumers purchase cost and the sales are thus signicantly
reduced. Therefore, the manufacturer does not change its wholesale price; and the expected
sales, and the manufacturers and the retailers expected prots are unchanged. The corre-
sponding curves in Figure 2 are thus horizontal lines.
The e¤ect of A on the expected sales in Zone 2 also implies that, compared with a scrap-
page program with a subsidy only (i.e., the MSRP cuto¤ level A is innitely large), a program
with a moderate value of the cuto¤ level is more e¤ective in reducing the wholesale price and
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thus boosting the sales of fuel e¢ cient automobiles. For example, comparing the expected
sales when A = ~A(s) with those when A = (1 + )w^1 in our numerical experiments, we
nd that a scrappage program with the MSRP cuto¤ level ~A(s) can e¤ectively improve the
expected sales by 21:3% than a program without a cuto¤ level.
The manufacturers prot reaches its maximum value when A  (1 + )w^1. Any further
increase in A cannot improve its prot any more. This means that the manufacturers expec-
tation on the value of the cuto¤ level signicantly di¤ers from the governments optimal cuto¤
level that maximizes the expected sales. Since the scrappage program is implemented mainly
to control carbon emissions and protect the environment, we next discuss the impact of the
sales of the fuel e¢ cient automobile on the reduction in CO2 emissions. According to Sachs
(2009) and Zolnik (2012), we can roughly estimate the reduction in CO2 emissions when more
consumers trade in their used automobiles for new, more fuel-e¢ cient automobiles. Speci-
cally, new fuel-e¢ cient automobiles can run 24:9 miles per gallon (mpg) on average, whereas
the average mpg for trade-in automobiles is 15:8. This means that the average di¤erence in
fuel e¢ ciency between new and used automobiles is 9:1 mpg. Assuming that an automobile
can run for 12; 000 miles per year, we nd that the new and used automobiles need 482 and
759 gallons of gasoline, respectively. That is, such a trade-in can reduce the gasoline usage
by 277 gallons. Because around 8:8 kilograms of CO2 is generated by burning one gallon of
gasoline, the trade-in can decrease CO2 emissions by 2:44 metric tons.
When A = ~A(s), the expected sales increase to the maximum level of 713; 973, the reduc-
tion in the gasoline consumption approximates 19:78 million gallons, and the corresponding
reduction in CO2 emissions is calculated as 1:74million metric tons. But, when A  (1+)w^1,
the expected sales decrease to 634; 803 and thus, the reduction in the gasoline consumption
and that in CO2 emissions are 17:65 million gallons and 1:55 million metric tons, respec-
tively. As the above results indicate, the e¤ectiveness of the scrappage program in reducing
CO2 emissions is dependent on the sales of the fuel-e¢ cient automobile. As Figure 2(a)
suggests, the government should adopt a moderate cuto¤ level (e.g., A = ~A(s)) rather than
implementing a high cuto¤ level A > ~A(s), in order to e¤ectively increase the sales of new
automobiles.
When the government does not implement any scrappage program (s = 0), the consumers
purchase decision is given as in Remark 1, and the manufacturer determines the wholesale
price as w^2. The resulting expected sales are D(w^2) = 1   F (w^2), and the manufacturers
expected prot is (w^2). As indicated by Figure 2(b), D(w^2) (the expected sales in Zone 1)
is much lower than the expected sales when the manufacturer qualies for the program (in
Zone 2), which are D(A=(1+)) when ~A(s)  A < (1+)w^1 and D(w^1) when A  (1+)w^1.
This suggests that a scrappage program with a su¢ ciently large MSRP cuto¤ level A can
signicantly increase the sales of new fuel-e¢ cient automobiles.
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6.1.2 The Impact of the Subsidy s
Using Theorem 5, we can investigate the impact of subsidy s on the manufacturers optimal
wholesale price and maximum expected prot, and the expected sales. Specically, if A  (1+
)w^1, then the manufacturer determines its optimal wholesale price as w^1, and its maximum
expected prot and the expected sales are increasing in s, according to Theorem 3. If (1 +
)w^2  A < (1 + )w^1, then the manufacturer decides to qualify for the scrappage program
and determines its optimal wholesale price as A=(1+), which is independent of the subsidy s.
However, the expected salesD(A=(1+)) and the manufacturers expected prot M1(A=(1+
)) are both increasing in s. If A < (1 + )w^2, then the manufacturer may or may not desire
to qualify for the scrappage program. When M1(A=(1 + ))  M2(w^2), the manufacturer
chooses to qualify for the scrappage program by setting its optimal wholesale price asA=(1+).
Since M1(A=(1 + )) is increasing in the subsidy s, we nd that if the government increases
its subsidy s to a su¢ ciently high level, then the manufacturer certainly has an incentive to
qualify for the scrappage program and obtain a greater prot. A critical question then arises
as follows: What is the minimum subsidy assuring that the manufacturer chooses to qualify
for the scrappage program?
Theorem 7 Given an MSRP cuto¤ level A, the minimum subsidy ~s(A) that leads the man-
ufacturer to qualify for the scrappage program can be given as follows:
1. If A=(1+) < w^2  =(1+), then ~s(A) is the unique solution that satises M1(A=(1+
)) = M2(w^2).
2. If A=(1+)  =(1+) < w^2, then ~s(A) is the unique solution that satises M1(A=(1+
)) = M2(=(1 + )).
Moreover, ~s(A) is decreasing in A. 
Recall from Theorem 5 that the manufacturer always decides to qualify for the scrappage
program when A  w^2(1+). We learn from Theorem 7 that, when A < w^2(1+), the subsidy
s should be greater than or equal to ~s(A), so as to assure that the manufacturer decides to
qualify for the program. Accordingly, if both the MSRP cuto¤ level and the subsidy are
su¢ ciently low, then the scrappage program may be ine¤ective, because the manufacturer is
unwilling to reduce its wholesale price and MSRP to qualify for the program. It follows that
a governments scrappage program with a su¢ ciently high value of A [e.g., A  w^2(1 + )]
is likely to be e¤ective even if the subsidy s is not large. This result is in agreement with
the practice that some governments (e.g., Mexico, Slovaks, and the United States) implement
a signicantly high cuto¤ level, and other governments (e.g., China, France, Germany, and
Japan) do not set any cuto¤ level. Moreover, another important reason why the governments
are willing to increase the cuto¤ level rather than the subsidy is that awarding a large subsidy
to consumers may bring a heavy nancial burden to the governments.
However, even if the cuto¤ level A is so high that the manufacturer decides to qualify for
the scrappage program, the expected sales and the manufacturers expected prot cannot be
signicantly improved when the subsidy is very low. According to Theorem 3, we nd that
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when A  ~A(s), both the manufacturers expected prot and the expected sales are increasing
in s. This means that, keeping A unchanged, the government can raise its subsidy to increase
the manufacturers expected prot and the expected sales, which can entice the manufacturer
to qualify for the scrappage program. In fact, we nd from Theorem 6 that ~A(s) is decreasing
in s, which implies that, to encourage the manufacturer to qualify for the scrappage program,
the government should increase s to a su¢ ciently high level s^ such that A  ~A(s^). Since
a very large subsidy may cause a heavy nancial burden, the government should determine
a proper value of subsidy subject to its budget constraint. This can be demonstrated by
the practice in China: In June 2009, a nationwide scrappage program was implemented to
o¤er subsidies of RMB3,000 RMB6,000 (equivalently, US$450 US$900) to consumers who
trade in used heavy polluting automobiles or trucks for new ones. However, this program
could only result in a little success in the rst several months; hence, the Chinese government
raised its subsidy to RMB5,000 RMB18,000 (equivalently, US$750 US$2,700). The new
scrappage program was proved to be e¤ective, because, until October 2010, the number of
replaced automobiles had been 2:84 105.
Figure 3: The impact of the subsidy s on the manufacturers optimal wholesale price w, the
expected sales D(w), the manufacturers expected prot M(w), and the retailers expected
prot R(w). Note that, in Zone 1 (where s < ~s(A)), the manufacturers optimal wholesale
price w is greater than A=(1 + ), and the manufacturer does not qualify for the scrappage
program, which is thus ine¤ective. In Zone 2 (where s  ~s(A)), w  A=(1 + ) and the
manufacturer qualies for the program, which is thus e¤ective.
We now perform numerical experiments to examine the e¤ect of subsidy s on the man-
ufacturers optimal wholesale price w, expected sales D(w), and the manufacturers and
retailers expected prots M(w) and R(w), assuming A = $30; 000 but using the values
of other parameters as in Example 1. We increase the value of s from $3; 600 to $4; 400 in
increments of $100, and plot Figures 3(a)-(d) to show the impact of s on w, D(w), M(w),
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and R(w). We nd that ~s(A) = $3; 835:98.
When s is small such that s < ~s(A) (Zone 1), the manufacturer determines its wholesale
price as w^2 and does not qualify for the scrappage program. As a result, consumers cannot
obtain the subsidy from the government, and the expected sales D(w^2) are thus low, as
shown in Figure 3(b); the governments total subsidy cost is zero. It follows that the optimal
wholesale price w^2, the expected sales D(w^2), the manufacturers and retailers expected
prots are independent of s; therefore, all the corresponding curves are horizontal lines in
Zone 1, as indicated by Figure 3.
When s is increased from s < ~s(A) (Zone 1) to s  ~s(A) (Zone 2), the manufacturer
reduces its wholesale price to A=(1+) in order to qualify for the program, and each consumer
can enjoy the subsidy. This generates a large increase in the expected sales, and the retailer
enjoys a great increase in its expected prot. Therefore, we observe jumps at the boundary
between Zone 1 and Zone 2 in Figures 3(a), (b), and (d). We note from Theorem 7 that at
s = ~s(A), the manufacturer is indi¤erent in his expected prot between qualifying and not
qualifying for the program; hence, we do not observe a jump in the manufacturers prot at
the boundary between Zone 1 and Zone 2 in Figure 3(c).
In Zone 2, the expected sales are D(A=(1 + )) = 1  F (A=(1 + )  s), and the govern-
ments total subsidy cost is Cs(s) = s[1 F (A=(1 +)  s)]. As s increases, the manufacturer
has no incentive to reduce its wholesale price because the manufacturer intends to assure its
prot margin while each consumer enjoys a greater net gain. In addition, when the govern-
ment increases s, the manufacturer does not increase its wholesale price because, otherwise,
the manufacturer will not qualify for the program. Therefore, the manufacturers optimal
wholesale price is independent of s when s  s( ~A), as indicated by Figure 3(a). As a result,
increasing the value of s can entice more low-valuation consumers to trade in their used auto-
mobiles, which implies that the expected sales are increasing in s; see Figure 3(b). Since the
manufacturers prot margin is not reduced (as argued above), its expected prot is increas-
ing in s, as shown in Figure 3(c). In addition, a higher subsidy helps raise the retail price
and thus improve the retailers prot margin. It follows that the retailers expected prot
increases as the value of s rises, as depicted in Figure 3(d).
From the above, we nd that even when the government sets a su¢ ciently high cuto¤ level
A, the subsidy is still helpful to increase the sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles for reducing
CO2 emissions and to raise the manufacturers and the retailers expected prots for assuring
the two rms incentives. However, we note from Figures 2 and 3 that when s  ~s(A),
increasing s does not signicantly raise the sales and two rmsexpected prots, compared
with the impact of A. In fact, a larger subsidy benets the high-valuation consumers but
is not signicantly e¤ective in attracting low-valuation consumers to buy. Therefore, the
government incurs a high subsidy cost without saliently improving the sales. This suggests
that the government needs to implement an appropriate MSRP cuto¤ level but may not need
to apply a very large subsidy.
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We also learn from Figure 3(b) that the expected sales D(w^2) when the government
does not implement any program are signicantly lower than the expected sales D(w) in
the presence of an e¤ective scrappage program (i.e., s  ~s(A)). This implies that when the
subsidy is su¢ ciently large, the scrappage program can signicantly stimulate more consumers
to buy fuel-e¢ cient automobiles.
6.1.3 The Governments Optimal Decisions
In practice, the government usually has a budget (denoted by Cs) for its scrappage program.
For example, the budget for the US governments CARSscrappage program was $3:0 billion,
and the German government a¤orded its scrappage program with a total amount of about $7
billion (e5 billion); see Aldred and Tepe (2011) and Lenski et al. (2010). It thus behooves us
to consider the following important question. Given a budget for the governments scrappage
program, what are the governments optimal MSRP cuto¤ level and subsidy that maximize
the expected sales?
We recall from Section 6.1.1 that given a subsidy s, in order to maximize the sales, the
government should set the MSRP cuto¤ level at A = ~A(s), and the manufacturer determines
its wholesale price as w = ~A(s)=(1 + ). The corresponding expected sales are D( ~A(s)) =
1   F ( ~A(s)=(1 + )   s). The scrappage program include both an MSRP cuto¤ level and a
subsidy. Thus, besides the cuto¤ level, the government should also determine the optimal
subsidy for the given budget Cs. In order to e¤ectively improve the sales, the total subsidy
cost i.e., Cs = sD( ~A(s)) should be equal to Cs; that is,
sD( ~A(s)) = Cs. (12)
As Theorem 6 indicates that ~A(s) is decreasing in s, and the expected salesD( ~A(s)) is increas-
ing in s. The total subsidy cost Cs(s) = sD( ~A(s)) is a monotone function. Consequently,
equation (12) has a unique optimal solution s.
Remark 2 In order to maximize the expected sales, the government should determine its
optimal MSRP cuto¤ level as A = ~A(s), and choose its optimal subsidy as s = fsjs 
D( ~A(s)) = Csg, where D( ~A(s)) = 1  F ( ~A(s)=(1 + )  s). 
Next, using the parameter values in Example 1 but increasing the budget Cs from $1:5109
to $8:0 109 in increments of $5 108, we plot Figure 4 to show the inuences of Cs on (i)
the governments optimal decisions A and s [in Figures 4(a) and (b), respectively], (ii) the
expected sales D(w) [in Figure 4(c)], and (iii) the manufacturers optimal wholesale price w
[in Figure 4(d)].
Using Figure 4, we can address the following two questions. Given the target sales of fuel-
e¢ cient automobiles, how much should the government prepare for its scrappage program?
and what are the optimal MSRP cuto¤ level and subsidy? For example, if the government
intends to attain the expected sales of 8:2  105, then we can learn from Figure 4(c) that
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Figure 4: The impact of the governments budget on its optimal decisions, the expected sales,
and the manufacturers optimal wholesale price.
the government should o¤er a total budget of $3:0  109, and we can use Figures 4(a) and
(b) to nd the optimal cuto¤ level A and subsidy s as $29; 400 and $3; 270, respectively.
For a given budget for the scrappage program, we can also use Figure 4 to make the optimal
decisions for the government and estimate the resulting expected sales. For example, if the
government has a budget of $5:0 109 for the program, then the optimal MSRP cuto¤ level
and subsidy should be $29; 230 and $5; 150, respectively, and the resulting expected sales
approximate 8:7 105.
We also observe from Figures 4(a) and (b) that the optimal subsidy is increasing in
the governments budget Cs, whereas the optimal MSRP cuto¤ level is decreasing in Cs.
This result may be surprising because the government could respond to a higher budget by
decreasing its cuto¤ level to encourage the manufacturer to reduce its wholesale price see
Figure 4(d) and qualify for the program, thus improving sales. We also observe from Figure
4(c) that the expected sales are increasing in Cs but at a decreasing rate, which implies that
a large budget may not help the scrappage program saliently increase the sales.
6.2 The Impact of the MSRP Markup Percentage 
As discussed in Section 3, the MSRP ps is calculated as a percentage markup of the wholesale
price w, i.e., ps = (1 + )w, where  is the markup percentage. Such an approach for the
calculation of MSRP has been widely used in the real-world automobile industry. Using
Theorem 5, we can nd that, given the scrappage program (A; s), if  is su¢ ciently small
such that A=(1+)  w^1, then the manufacturer determines its wholesale price as w^1 (which is
independent of ) and qualies for the scrappage program, achieving the prot M1(w^1). As a
result, the expected sales are D(w^1) = 1 F (w^1 s). If  is given such that w^2  A=(1+) <
w^1, then the manufacturer still decides to qualify for the scrappage program, determining its
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wholesale price as A=(1 + ). The resulting expected sales are D(w) = 1 F (A=(1 + )  s),
and the manufacturers expected prot is M1(A=(1+)). Note that M1(A=(1+)) is lower
than M1(w^1).
If the markup percentage  is given such that A=(1 + ) < w^2  =(1 + ), then the
manufacturer may or may not decide to qualify for the scrappage program. Specically, when
  ~, where ~ is the unique solution to the equation that M1(A=(1 + )) = M2(w^2), the
manufacturer will choose the optimal wholesale price as A=(1 +) to qualify for the program.
But, when  > ~, the manufacturer will not qualify for the program. We also nd that the
manufacturers expected prot when A=(1 + ) < w^2  =(1 + ) is larger than that when
A=(1 + )  =(1 + ) < w^2.
From the above, we conclude that the markup percentage  greatly inuences the man-
ufacturers decision on whether or not to qualify for the scrappage program. That is, the
manufacturer with a larger value of  has less incentive to qualify for the program, which
means that the program is less likely to be e¤ective.
Figure 5: The impact of the markup percentage  on the manufacturers optimal wholesale
price w, the expected sales D(w), the manufacturers expected prot M(w), and the
retailers expected prot R(w). Note that, in Zone 1 (where   ~), the manufacturers
optimal wholesale price w is greater than A=(1 + ), and the manufacturer does not qualify
for the scrappage program, which is thus ine¤ective. In Zone 2 (where  < ~), w  A=(1+),
and the manufacturer qualies for the program, which is thus e¤ective.
To demonstrate our above results, we use the parameter values as in Example 1 but
increase  from 0:03 to 0:12 in increments of 0:01, and plot Figure 5 to show the impact of
 on the manufacturers optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, and two rmsexpected
prots. When  falls in Zone 2 (i.e.,   ~), the manufacturer determines its optimal wholesale
price as A=(1+), so as to qualify for the scrappage program. Accordingly, each consumer can
enjoy a subsidy from the government. Moreover, the wholesale price A=(1 + ) is decreasing
in ; thus, a larger value of  results in higher expected sales, as shown in Figure 5(b). As a
consequence, the retailer benets from a larger value of  by achieving higher expected sales
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and a higher prot margin, as indicated by Figure 5(d). But, the manufacturer is worse o¤,
because the manufacturers prot margin is greatly reduced due to a decrease in its wholesale
price, as shown in Figure 5(c). The expected sales are D(w) = 1 F (A=(1 +)  s), and the
governments total subsidy cost is Cs(s) = sD(A=(1 + )), which are both increasing in .
We also learn from Figure 5(a) that, when the value of  is increased from   ~ (Zone 2)
to  > ~ (Zone 1), the manufacturer loses its incentive to qualify for the scrappage program,
because the manufacturer needs to determine a signicantly low wholesale price to qualify for
the program. To assure the prot margin, the manufacturer keeps its wholesale price at a high
level as w^2. As a result, no consumer enjoys a subsidy from the government, which entails a
large decrease in the number of consumers trading in their used automobiles. The decrease
in the expected sales generates a large decrease in the retailers expected prot. Therefore,
there appear the jumps at the boundary between Zone 1 and Zone 2 in Figures 5(a), (b), and
(d). Moreover, the manufacturers and retailers expected prots in Zone 1 are lower than
those in Zone 2, as shown in Figures 5(c) and (d). Moreover, Figure 5(d) indicates that the
retailers prot reaches its maximum value when  = ~. In Zone 1, the optimal wholesale
price w^2 is independent of , and thus the expected sales and the manufacturers expected
prot do not depend on , which are represented by the horizontal lines in Figures 5(a), (b),
and (c). However, the retailers prot is increasing in  because an increase in  generates a
higher value of the MSRP and then increases the retailers prot margin that is dependent
on the MSRP.
From the above, we conclude that even when the government chooses a su¢ ciently high
cuto¤ level A (as discussed in Section 6.1.1) and a proper subsidy s (as discussed in Section
6.1.2), the manufacturer may not benet from the scrappage program, because, for the case of
a large MSRP markup percentage , the manufacturer does not intend to reduce the wholesale
price to qualify for the scrappage program.
7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we considered a two-level automobile supply chain, where a manufacturer
and a retailer serve heterogeneous consumers in a fuel-e¢ cient automobile market under a
governments scrappage program involving a cuto¤ level and a subsidy. We examined the
impact of the program on the governments optimal decisions, the manufacturers optimal
wholesale price, the negotiated retail price, and consumerspurchase decisions. Since the
retail price charged to a consumer is determined as a result of the negotiation between the
consumer and the retailer, who may have di¤erent bargaining powers, we used the GNB
concept to characterize the negotiated retail price. We then developed the manufacturers
expected prot function, which was maximized to nd the optimal wholesale price for the
manufacturer. In addition, we compared the optimal wholesale price, the expected sales, and
the manufacturers and retailers expected prots under the scrappage program and those in
the absence of such a program. We also investigated the impact of the MSRP cuto¤ level, the
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subsidy, the governments budget, and the markup percentage (that was used to calculate the
MSRP) on the manufacturers optimal pricing decision, the expected sales, the manufacturers
and retailers expected prots, and the governments optimal decisions.
We summarize our major managerial insights as follows:
1. Given a subsidy s, there exists a minimum cuto¤ level ~A(s) for the manufacturer to
qualify for the program, which is decreasing in s. When the cuto¤ level A is increased
from a value lower than ~A(s) to a value higher than ~A(s), the manufacturers optimal
wholesale price is decreased, whereas both the expected sales and the manufacturers
expected prot are increased.
If A is su¢ ciently large such that A  (1+)w^1  ~A(s), then the manufacturers optimal
wholesale price and the expected sales are independent of A but increasing in s; as a
result, both the manufacturer and the retailer can benet from the scrappage program.
If (1 + )w^1  A  ~A(s), then the optimal wholesale price and the manufacturers
prot are increasing in A, but the expected sales and the retailers expected prot are
decreasing in A. When A is equal to ~A(s), the expected sales reach the maximum value
and the e¤ectiveness of the scrappage program is thus maximized.
2. The manufacturer may not prefer a moderate MSRP cuto¤ level (i.e., A = ~A(s)), be-
cause its expected prot is the highest when the cuto¤ level takes a su¢ ciently high
value (i.e., A  (1+)w^1). This means that the manufacturers preferred cuto¤ level sig-
nicantly di¤ers from the governments optimal cuto¤ level that maximizes the expected
sales. Therefore, the governments optimal decision may inuence the manufacturers
motivation for qualifying for the scrappage program.
3. Given a cuto¤ level A, if s  ~s(A), then the manufacturer desires to qualify for the
scrappage program, and the expected sales and the manufacturers and the retailers
prots are increasing in s. That is, the e¤ectiveness of a scrappage program requires that
the subsidy should be su¢ ciently high such that s  ~s(A). Any increase in the subsidy
in the range [0; ~s(A)] cannot help increase the sales. Although a larger subsidy when
s  ~s(A) can result in higher sales, it also increases the governments cost. Thus, the
optimal subsidy should be determined according to the target sales that the government
expects the manufacturer to achieve.
4. Given the governments sales target, we can uniquely compute the optimal MSRP cut-
o¤ level and subsidy, and nd the corresponding budget for the government. The gov-
ernments optimal subsidy is increasing in the governments budget, while its optimal
MSRP cuto¤ level is decreasing in the budget. This may be a surprising insight because
the government could respond to a higher budget by raising its cuto¤ level to encourage
the manufacturer to qualify for the program and thus improving sales. Moreover, the
expected sales are increasing in the budget but at a decreasing rate, which implies that
a larger budget may not help the scrappage program saliently increase the sales.
5. Given a scrappage program, there exists a maximum markup percentage ~ for the
manufacturer to qualify for the program. Moreover, when   ~, the manufacturers
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expected prot is decreasing in , while the expected sales and the retailers prot are
increasing in . The manufacturer with a smaller markup percentage  is more likely
to reduce its wholesale price and qualify for the scrappage program. The insight is
important since the government needs to understand which manufacturers are more
likely to qualify for its scrappage program.
In conclusion, we nd that the scrappage program with a su¢ ciently large MSRP cuto¤
level and a proper subsidy is useful to stimulating the sales of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles, and
also increasing the protability of the automobile manufacturer, who thus has an incentive
to qualify for the program. Moreover, for the scrappage program, the governments optimal
cuto¤ level and subsidy that maximize the expected sales depend on the budget for such a
program.
In future, some research directions may be worth considering. First, we may investigate
the scrappage program in a dynamic, temporal setting, focusing on its impact on the manufac-
turers future pricing decisions, its long-run average prot, and the expected sales. Secondly,
it could be important for the manufacturer to consider the investment in its product design.
Since the government implements a program to encourage the use of fuel-e¢ cient automobiles,
we may need to investigate if and how the program can induce the manufacturer to invest
in designing a green automobile for environment protection. Thirdly, in practice a consumer
may be willing to sell his or her used automobile in a secondary market instead of trading
it in. In another research direction, we may consider the supply chain when a governments
scrappage program and a secondary market jointly exist, and examine if and how the exis-
tence of the secondary market impacts the manufacturers decisions and the e¤ectiveness of
the governments scrappage program in stimulating consumerstrade-ins.
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Appendix A Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. To nd the GNB discount , we need to solve the constrained
maximization problem in (2). First, temporarily ignoring the constraints that u(;w)  0 and
w (1 + )w  0, we maximize  in (2) to nd the optimal discount for the unconstrained
problem.
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We can nd that at any point (the value of ) satisfying d=d = 0, the second-order
derivative d2=d2 is negative, i.e., d2=d2 < 0. It thus follows that  is a unimodal
function of the discount  with a unique maximizing value .
We equate d=d in (13) to zero, solve the resulting equation for , and nd the GNB
discount  as follows:
 =
(1 +   )w   (1  )[ + 1fwA=(1+)g  s]
(1 + )w
.
However, we should note that the negotiated retail price pr should be less than or equal to
the MSRP, i.e., pr = (1   )(1 + )w  ps = (1 + )w, which means that   0. We thus
have the following discussions:
1. When (1 )[+ 1fwA=(1+)g s]  (1 +  )w, or   2  [(1 +  )w]=(1 ) 
1fwA=(1+)g s, the optimal   0. We substitute the value of  into the consumers
i
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and the retailers objective functions, and obtain
u(; w) = (+1fwA=(1+)gs w) and w (1+)w = (1 )(+1fwA=(1+)gs w),
which must be nonnegative when   1  w   1fwA=(1+)g  s. Accordingly, when
1    2, the negotiated retail price is
pr(wj) = (1  )(1 + )w
=





= (1 + )w   (1 +   )w + (1  )[ + 1fwA=(1+)g  s]
= w + (1  )[ + 1fwA=(1+)g  s].
2. When 2 <   ,  = 0, and the negotiated retail price is pr(wj) = ps = (1 + )w.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we ignore the constraint that c < w  A=(1 + ). As Lemma
1 indicates, the manufacturers expected prot M1(w) is a log-concave function of wholesale
price w with a unique optimal solution as w^1. Next, we determine the manufacturers optimal
wholesale price under the constraint that c < w  A=(1 + ). There exists two possible
scenarios:
1. If w^1  A=(1 + ), then the optimal wholesale price is w1 = w^1.
2. If w^1 > A=(1 + ), then the optimal wholesale price is w1 = A=(1 + ), since prot
function M1(w) is a log-concave function of wholesale price w, and thus it is increasing
in w when w < w^1.
This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove this theorem, we need to consider the following three steps:
1. The sales realized by the retailer are calculated as D(w^1) = B[1  F (w^1   s)], which is
only dependent on subsidy s. Recall from Corollary 1 that 0 < @w^1=@s < 1. We thus
obtain that, @D(w^1)=@s = Bf(w^1  s)(1  @w^1=@s) > 0, which means that sales D(w^1)
are strictly increasing in s.
2. The manufacturers and the retailers expected prots are rewritten as




[(1  ) R 2(w^1)




where 2(w^1)  (1 + )w^1=(1 )  s. First-order derivative of M(w^1) w.r.t. s and
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That is, both M(w^1) and R(w^1) are increasing in s.
3. Di¤erentiating total subsidy Cs(s) = sB[1  F (w^1   s)] once w.r.t. s gives,
@(Cs(s))=@s = Bf[1  F (w^1   s)]  sf(w^1   s)(@w^1=@s  1)g > 0,
because @w^1=@s < 1, according to Corollary 1.
We thus complete the proof of this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that without the
constraint that A=(1 + ) < w  =(1 + ), the manufacturers prot function M2(w) =
B(w  c)[1 F (w)] is log-concave in w, and we can use the rst-order condition of M2(w) to
obtain the optimal solution as w^2 = [1  F (w^2)]=f(w^2) + c. Considering the constraint that
A=(1 + ) < w  =(1 + ), we nd:
1. If A=(1 + ) < w^2  =(1 + ), then the optimal wholesale price is w^2, i.e., w2 = w^2.
2. If w^2  A=(1+), then the optimal wholesale price is determined as w2 = A=(1+)+",
where " is an innitesimally positive number.
3. If A=(1 + ) < =(1 + ) < w^2, then the optimal wholesale price is w2 = =(1 + ).
This theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 5. We learn from Corollary 2 that w^2 < w^1 given the MSRP cuto¤
level A   and subsidy s > 0, and note from (7) and (10) that M1(w) > M2(w) for any
w > c. Thus, to nd the manufacturers optimal wholesale price, we need to consider the
following four cases:
1. If A=(1 + )  w^1, then w1 = w^1 and w2 = A=(1 + ) + ". Since
M2(A=(1 + ) + ") < M2(A=(1 + )) < M1(A=(1 + )) < M1(w^1),
the manufacturer should determine its optimal wholesale price as w = w^1.
2. If w^2  A=(1 + ) < w^1, then w1 = A=(1 + ) and w2 = A=(1 + ) + ". Since
M2(A=(1 + ) + ") < M2(A=(1 + )) < M1(A=(1 + )), the manufacturer should
choose its optimal wholesale price as w = A=(1 + ).
3. If A=(1 + ) < w^2  =(1 + ), then w1 = A=(1 + ) and w2 = w^2. Note that
M1(A=(1 + )) may or may not be larger than M2(w^2), which depends on the values
of A=(1 + ) and s. Therefore, the manufacturer should compare M1(A=(1 + )) and
M2(w^2) to nd the optimal wholesale price; that is, w can be obtained as shown in
this theorem.
4. If A=(1 + ) < =(1 + ) < w^2, then w1 = A=(1 + ) and w

2 =
=(1 + ). Noting that
M1(=(1 + )) may or may not be larger than M2(w^2), which depends on the values
of =(1 + ) and s, we can nd the manufacturers optimal wholesale price w as shown
in this theorem.
We thus complete the proof of this theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6. When A  (1 + )w^2, the manufacturer qualies for the scrappage
iii
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program; but, when A < (1 +)w^2, the manufacturer may or may not qualify for the scheme.
To prove this theorem, we need to consider the scenario that A < (1 + )w^2, and derive the
minimum cuto¤ level ~A(s) that assures the willingness of the manufacturer to qualify for the
scheme.
We nd from Theorem 5 that, if A=(1 +) < w^2  =(1 +), M1(A=(1 +)) may or may
not be larger than M2(w^2), which depends on the values of A=(1+) and s. Note that, when
w < w^2, both M1(w) and M2(w) are increasing in w, because of the following two facts:
(i) M1(w) > M2(w) for any w > c, as indicated by (7) and (10); and (ii) w^1 > w^2 if s > 0,
as indicated by Corollary 2. It thus follows that, given a subsidy s, we can nd a unique
MSRP cuto¤ level ~A(s) that is the solution of the equation that M1(A=(1 + )) = M2(w^2).
Because M1(w) is increasing in w when w < w^2, M1(A=(1 + )) is increasing in A when
A=(1 + ) < w^2. Noting that w^2 is independent of A, as shown in Theorem 4, we nd that,
when A > ~A(s), M1(A=(1 + )) > M2(w^2); when A < ~A(s), M1(A=(1 + )) < M2(w^2).
Similarly, we can nd a unique MSRP cuto¤ level ~A(s) when w^2 > =(1 + ).
Next, we show that ~A(s) is a decreasing function of s. Using (7), we have,
M1(A=(1 + ))  B(A=(1 + )  c)[1  F (A=(1 + )  s)],
which is increasing in both A and s. Thus, to assure one of the equations that M1(A=(1 +
)) = M2(w^2) and M1(A=(1+)) = M2(=(1+)) where both M2(w^2) and M2(=(1+
)) are independent of A and s, we need to decrease the cuto¤ level A when s increases. This
theorem is thus proved.
Proof of Theorem 7. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6, we focus on the case that
A < (1 + )w^2. When A=(1 + ) < w^2  =(1 + ), we nd that, given the MSRP cuto¤
level A, a unique ~s(A) is determined such that M1(A=(1 + )) = M2(w^2), because, as
indicated by the proof of Theorem 6, the manufacturers expected prot M1(A=(1 + )) is
increasing in the subsidy s. Similarly, we can calculate the minimum subsidy ~s(A) when
A=(1 + ) < =(1 + ) < w^2.
We learn from the proof of Theorem 6 that M1(A=(1+)) is increasing in both the cuto¤
level A and the subsidy s. It thus follows that increasing A should result in a decrease in
the subsidy s, so that one of the following equations holds: M1(A=(1 + )) = M2(w^2) and
M1(A=(1 + )) = M2(=(1 + )). That is, the minimum subsidy ~s(A) is decreasing in the
cuto¤ level A. We thus complete the proof of this theorem.
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 1
If w  A=(1 + ), then di¤erentiating M1(w) in (7) once w.r.t. w yields,
@M1(w)
@w
= B[1  F (w^1   s)] B(w   c)f(w^1   s).
iv
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Solving the rst-order condition that @M1(w)=@w = 0, we nd that w^1 = [1   F (w^1  




=  2Bf(w^1   s) B(w   c)f 0(w^1   s).





=  2B[f(w^1   s)]
2 +B[1  F (w^1   s)]f 0(w^1   s)
f(w^1   s) .
If f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave on [0; ], then we can nd that [f(w^1  
s)]2 + [1  F (w^1   s)]f 0(w^1   s) > 0, and @2M1(w)=@w2jw=w^1 < 0; thus, the manufacturers
prot M1(w) is unimodal in w.
Appendix C Proof of Corollaries
Proof of Corollary 1. Recall from Theorem 2 that w^1 = [1   F (w^1   s)]=f(w^1   s) + c.
We di¤erentiate both sides of this equation once w.r.t. s, and have
dw^1
ds
=   [f(w^1   s)]








Because f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave, [1   F ()] must be also log-
concave, as shown by Bagnoli and Bergstrom (Bagnoli & Bergstrom 2005). It then follows
that [f(w^1   s)]2 + [1   F (w^1   s)]f(w^1   s) > 0. We thus nd from (14) that dw^1=ds and
(dw^1=ds  1) must have di¤erent signs; this means that 0 < dw^1=ds < 1.
We thus complete this proof.
Proof of Corollary 2. FromTheorem 2, we nd that the optimal wholesale price w^1 satises
the equation that w^1 = [1   F (w^1   s)]=f(w^1   s) + c. Di¤erentiating the manufacturers
expected prot M2(w) w.r.t. w yields
@M2(w)
@w
= B[1  F (w)] B(w   c)f(w).
Since the p.d.f. f() is continuously di¤erentiable and log-concave,  must have an increasing






= B[1  F (w^1)] B [1  F (w^1   s)]f(w^1)
f(w^1   s)
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Noting that w^2 satises the equation that M2(w)=@w = 0, we conclude that, if s > 0, then
w^2 < w^1.
vi
